view: "the heart of the difficulty lies in the fact that trust property has two contemporaneous owners."
14 And yet there have been doubters. Lawson was one. 15 Likewise, Bernard Rudden has written that "the orthodox explanation, given in terms of the traditional distinction between law and equity, provides only a historical and not a rational account of the trust." 16 The doubters are right. The trust does not have to be conceptualised within the framework of English law. The trust presupposes neither equity nor divided ownership. The ius commune tradition already has the categories with which to understand the trust. Scots law, which has known the trust since the 17th century and has more or less successfully integrated it within an almost pure ius commune system of property law, shows how.
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II. CAN THE TRUST BE EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS?
CAN trust be explained as forming part of the law of obligations, perhaps as a special form of contract? To some extent it can. 18 It is too seldom stressed that to be a trustee a person must so consent." He voluntarily undertakes the obligations of the trust. The civil law tradition is familiar with the fiducia cum amico™ in which a person transfers the ownership of assets to another, for the purpose of administration, the recipient being bound-as a matter of the law of obligations-to administer them in a certain manner. How near does that go to the trust?
One objection to seeing trusts as contracts is that the trust does not obey the dictates of privity theory, but then privity is hardly a universal truth, and even in the common law world is as honoured in the breach as in the observance. Stipulatio alteri can achieve a great deal, and indeed one may suspect that its historical absence from English law 21 motive for the development of the trust, with its freedom from the shackles of privity. It is also true that the trust does not conform to classical notions of contract formation, but few today would regard that as a point of great significance. Nineteenth century theories of contract formation have been eroded by experience and by reflection.
Another possible objection to the attempt to understand the trust as a sort of contract is the fact that a beneficiary can in some circumstances hold liable a third party who acquires trust property in bad faith. This fact is often held up as an illustration of the semi-real nature of the beneficiary's right. But nothing is more common than for legal systems to provide that if A breaks his contract with B as a result of collusion with C, C may have some liability to B.
22 It does not follow that a right is real merely because the holder of that right can claim the protection of the law against interference by third parties. 23 If C did not act in bad faith but took gratuitously, he may be liable to B, where A is a trustee and B is a beneficiary, but again this is not so surprising: all legal systems provide that gratuitous transfers are potentially reversible where the transferor is insolvent 24 -and if he is solvent B should suffer no loss anyway.
Another objection to the "obligational" view of the trust is that it does not explain why breach of trust may attract criminal sanctions. But this is not a special feature of the trust: persons in a fiduciary position may be prosecuted for fraud, and there are many fiduciaries apart from trustees. And the concept of a fiduciary exists also in the civil law tradition.
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In brief: trusts are capable of generating both third party rights and third party liabilities. But the same is true of contract law. There are, indeed, some differences, in these areas, between trusts and contracts, but the differences are matters of detail.
The main difficulty in the obligational view of trusts is that it does not explain the effect of the trust in relation to the rights of creditors-the 22. Tony Honor* has written that "the conclusion must be that civil law systems are capable of protecting the trust beneficiary by the doctrine of notice to the same extent as does English law by its recourse to equitable interests in property. 24. That is to say, the set of rules whereby donations, and other juridical acts, by an insolvent debtor, which have the effect of diminishing the value of the debtor's estate, may be voidable at the instance of the unpaid creditors. The detailed rules vary from one legal system to another but (at least in the civil law world) all derive from the aciio pauliana.
25. Tutor rem pup Mi emtre non potesv. idemquc porrigendum at ad similia; id at ad curatores procurators el qui negotia aliens gerunt. (Dig.18,1,34 Trusts without Equity 603 "insolvency effect". This (the priority which the beneficiaries have over the trustee's creditors) is surely the central fact of the trust which any theory must recognise and explain. 26 If the trust is in its essence a contract, it will not defeat the rights of the owner's other creditors.
III. TRUST AS AGENCY?
SOMETHING like a trust can be created by locating ownership in the "beneficiary", and conferring on the "trustee" extensive contractual powers, including powers of alienation. Such an arrangement can involve "mandate without representation."
27 If things are done in this way, the insolvency effect is explained: the creditors of the "trustee" are defeated, because it is the "beneficiary" who is the owner. In the bewind of Dutch law, and of the Roman-Dutch systems of southern Africa, we see this idea developed into a formal institution. 28 But though it functions as a trust, the bewind is not trust, for a simple reason: the location of legal title is the reverse of the trust.
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IV. DO THE BENEFICIARIES HAVE RIGHTS IN REMt
So is Professor Fratcher right in saying that "the trust is a legal device developed in England whereby ownership of property is split"? 30 Is the Privy Council right to say that "the distinction between the legal and the equitable estate is of the essence of the trust"?
31 Is Amos right to say that "trust property has two contemporaneous owners"? 32 Is it true that "the 26. This is so even though most reported trust cases do not turn on this issue. As a comparison, the central doctrine of company law is the separate personality of the company, even if most reported company law cases do not turn on this point.
27. This conceptualisation of the trust was common in Scots law in the 17th and 18th centuries. Trust was often described as a combination of deposition and mandatum, with the depositum being a deposit of ownership rather than possession. See Are beneficial rights proprietary, or real, rights? Is ownership divided? One reason why the question is so difficult is that it can be asked at different levels. As a question addressed to the individual systems of the common law tradition, the answer has to be affirmative. 35 It is true that even within that tradition there have been doubters, but the "in rem" view has come to prevail. And it might be argued that that is the only level-the level of particular legal systems-at which the question makes sense. There is no Begriffshimmel, no "heaven of concepts." But that is too short an answer. Lawyers from different traditions have to speak with each other, and not merely by way of academic debate. No one would say that, since "sale" has no absolute system-neutral meaning, therefore the Convention on the International Sale of Goods is a pointless exercise. And especially within the European Union we have to try to understand each other. The very existence of the Union, with its constantlyexpanding sphere of Union-wide legislation, means that there has to be a system-neutral background of shared legal ideas. I do not wish to say anything of the idea of the ius commune europaeum novum except to observe that in some sense it must exist already, for Union legislation must use law-bound language.
Thus there is a problem: a system-neutral language is both necessary and impossible. I cannot resolve this antinomy. What this article attempts to do, is to understand the trust from an admittedly civilian standpoint, (1) A real right is presumptively valid erga omnes. By contract, a beneficial right is not.
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(2) If the right of the beneficiary is real, how is it that a person acquiring from the trustee can take free from the rights of the beneficiary? If the beneficiary's right is personal, the difficulty disappears: the third party is acquiring from the owner, and no other real rights affect the asset. (3) In international private law beneficial interests behave much more like personal rights than like real rights. (4) In general, real rights in immovables can be, and usually must be, registered, whilst personal rights do not need to be, and in general cannot be, registered. 39 In this respect beneficial rights follow personal rights. (5) The rights of the beneficiary are transferable in the same manner as any personal rights, namely by assignment or cession, and not by the means used for the transfer of real rights. (6) Real rights are normally subject to the "principle of specificity". They are like labels glued to particular things. Consider the paradigm examples: ownership, servitude, pledge. But beneficial rights attach not so much to things as to funds, whose contents are-or may be-constantly shifting while at the same time the fund continues as an entity. Where a beneficial right involves a right to a particular asset-as where A conveyed land to B for A's own use while A went off to crusade-there may be some plausibility about describing it as real. That plausibility declines where the beneficial right is a right simply to money, without reference to any particular asset at all. (7) Beneficial rights are often indeterminate. It may be certain that a person is a beneficiary and yet it may be wholly uncertain what his rights are. It may even be wholly uncertain whether he will ever benefit at all-a strong example of this being the discretionary trust. 40 Moreover, the very identity of beneficiaries may be indeterminate, as where a trust confers benefits on the unborn issue of a named person. Whilst personal rights can (more or less) be reconciled with this sort of thing, real rights cannot. 41 Of course, some beneficial rights might be real and others not: but that seems rather arbitrary. (8) The central problem of the trust is to explain the insolvency effect-the fact that the rights of the beneficiaries are, in principle, unaffected by the insolvency of the trustee. If the rights of beneficiaries were real, that would be an explanation.
Yet it seems to be accepted that there exist at least some kinds of trust where it is senseless to attribute equitable ownership to the beneficiaries. Charitable trusts are examples of this, as are other "purpose" trusts, and indeed even in discretionary private trusts arguably examples may also be found. 42 Yet the insolvency effect operates in all trusts regardless of whether the rights Trusts without Equity 607 of the beneficiaries are "real" or not. Thus the theory that beneficial rights are real does not even solve the problem for which it was created. It is-at best-the fifth wheel on the car.
43
(9) It is often remarked that the trustee is treated as owner "only" as regards third parties, whilst as between trustee and beneficiary it is the beneficiary who is owner. But this is a muddle, and in fact the true conclusion is the opposite one: beneficial rights are in fact not real. Real rights are defined primarily in terms of third party effect. 44 The fact that in third-party terms-for instance in suing an intruder for trespass or registering a title-it is the trustee who is owner shows where ownership lies. There is nothing mysterious or puzzling about an owner who undertakes, by way of obligation, to hold the whole benefit for someone else: to call that "divided ownership" is mystification. 45 The Court of Justice has been obliged to consider whether a beneficial right is a real right in the context of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention. 46 This provides that in an action concerning "rights in rent in immovable property' 1 jurisdiction belongs to the courts of the country where the property is situated. Quoted here is the official English translation. The original text was of course not drafted in English. The French text speaks of droits riels immobiliers. A Scots lawyer would not translate this as "rights in rem" but as "real rights", 47 but EU texts and international conventions naturally have their English language version framed in terms of English law, and the same is true when they are transposed into domestic UK law by Westminster legislation. Though natural,, this can be problematic for the Scots lawyer, as the present example illustrates. In Webb v. Webb 48 the Court of Justice had to decide what Article 16 meant in relation to trusts. A father bought property in France but arranged for the son to be registered as owner. Later they fell out, and the father sued in the English courts for a declaration that the son held for the father on trust. One line of defence for the son was that this 43. A connected point is that the trusts assets themselves may be partially or wholly personal rights (even "equitable" rights), and it could hardly be that the rights of the beneficiaries arc real while those of the trustee are personal.
44. Robinson Crusoe had no law. When an island has two people, there must be law-ubi societal ibi ius-but only personal rights are needed, not real rights. Real rights will arrive with the third castaway. was an action in rem and so the English courts did not have jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal referred the matter to Luxembourg, which held that Article 16 did not apply, because the action did not concern real rights in French property. There has been some disquiet in England about this decision. To a Scots lawyer it looks obviously correct. In Scots law the right of a beneficiary is a personal right and not a real right. So what conclusion can we draw from the decision? The natural conclusion is that the term right in rem as used by lawyers in the common law tradition does not precisely correspond to the civilian conception of a real right. 49 Right in rem is a wider conception: it includes rights regarded as real rights in the civilian tradition but it includes some other rights too. Hence the official English version of Article 16 is a mistranslation. Or at least so it seems when viewed from north of the border, and also, it seems, from Luxembourg.
A connected terminological point concerns the word "proprietary." In the common law systems it is natural to distinguish remedies (and rights) into personal and proprietary. When translating into civilian terminology, one must be careful. Many "proprietary" remedies and rights are, in civilian terms, real, but others are not. For instance, it is unclear to what extent Scots law recognises a right to trace. But to the extent that it does, the right is not classifiable as "proprietary", 50 since the tracer has no real right. The point is primarily linguistic rather than substantive.
The legal realist will be impatient with all this agonising about whether a right is real or not. Concepts should be our servants and not our masters. But we cannot escape formalism. Those who claim to reject formalism are fellow formalists with a rival theory of their own.
V. TRUST AS PATRIMONY
THE concept of patrimony is that of the totality of a person's assets, and, in its broader sense, his liabilities also. It is sometimes supposed to have been an invention of 19th century legal scholars. That view might seem to receive support if one looks at most standard texts on Roman law, which refer to patrimonium only in the sense of the patrimonium caesaris, the imperial patrimony. But that view is quite wrong. For example, only a little research in the sources is necessary to show that the later civilian concept of patrimony, or something pretty near it, already existed in Roman law. The word patrimonium is used in this sense by Papinian, 51 by 55 The concept was to be developed later in the civilian tradition, but it has been there from almost the beginning. What happened in the 19th century was, rather, a reaction against the idea of special patrimonies and in favour of a single general patrimony." This is not the place to elaborate on the concept of patrimony, though it may be observed that one of its benefits is to remove a
The concept of patrimony, or something much the same, is known also to English law, under the name of "estate"" or, sometimes, "fund." 58 "Estate" has more than one meaning, but in the sense of winding up the "estate" of a deceased person, or administering the "estate" of a bankrupt, the word is being used too in the sense of patrimony.
In general, the principle is: one person, one patrimony. Everyone has a patrimony, no one has more than one. But the civilian tradition admitted qualifications to this principle. As well as his ordinary patrimony, a person could sometimes have a "special patrimony." (Such as dos orpeculium in the Roman law.) For example, matrimonial property regimes sometimes necessitated the existence of a special patrimony. 59 In such a special patrimony there is real subrogation, i.e. the principle that a thing bought with money from that source was part of that special patrimony, and conversely. 60 Thus the assets of the special patrimony are segregated from the general patrimony, and to some extent the civilian tradition has likewise accepted segregation of liabilities also. Real subrogation is the key to the doctrine of patrimony, and patrimony is the key to the trust.
In other words, a trust is a special patrimony. There is nothing surprising about this conclusion," except that it has not been more widely understood. One frequently meets continental lawyers who fret and puzzle about the trust, to whom the trust is an arcanum, to be understood only in terms of the mysteries of equity, those who have swallowed whole that remarkable statement in the preamble to the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts about the trust being a "unique legal institution" which was "developed in courts of equity in common law jurisdictions", those who accept at face value the assertion that the right of the beneficiary is a right in rem. Yet the civilian tradition actually has and has always had the appropriate concepts. 62 There is an irony here. Here are three pictures. The first shows the ordinary case of one person and his patrimony, the patrimony being a bag with two parts, namely the liabilities and the assets. The second is the case of the person who is also a trustee: it illustrates the essential principle of one person, but two patrimonies. The third shows the trust which has two trustees. Their title is a "joint" one, as opposed to co-ownership: that is a necessary feature of the trust. With the explanation of trust as patrimony everything falls into place. The rights of beneficiaries are personal rights. 64 They are personal rights against the trustee, 65 enforceable against the special patrimony. (And sometimes, depending on the legal system and the circumstances of the case, against the general patrimony also. As for the fact that a trust estate is a "fund" the constituent items of which may change without changing the identity of the fund, this is of the essence of the idea of a patrimony. It is also essential to the trust concept. Indeed the chief reason why the German Treuhand falls short of the trust is that in the Treuhand real subrogation does not fully operate. 67 (There may, indeed, be subrogation (Surrogation) in respect of the "internal" relationship, that is to say, as between Treuhdnder and Treugeber, but this has no "external" effect.)
Far from beneficial trust rights having priority, they are in fact postponed claims. For if a trust becomes insolvent, the claims of the beneficiaries are postponed to the claims of those who are creditors of the trust. If anything needs to be explained, it is this fact. But the explanation is not difficult. It is the explaining of priority which is difficult-very difficult indeed unless one invokes the idea of a real right. But explaining postponement is unproblematic. (And no one would seek to argue that ordinary creditors of a trustee all have real rights.) The conception is simple: a beneficial right is a personal right which is to be met only when creditors have been provided for. (Indeed, in commercial transactions subordinated debt is common and can be created purely by contract.)
The patrimonial conception of the trust also explains, or at least underlies the explanation of, other features. It helps to explain why a trust will not fail for want of a trustee, so that even if all the trustees die the trust continues, and new trustees can be appointed. 68 It helps to explain how it is that a court can take a trust out of the hands of the existing trustees and place it in the hands of new trustees. It explains why a trust estate, as such, can be made bankrupt, at any rate in Scots law 69 and in South African law. 70 So can trusts be located in the civil law taxonomy of private law? They can. Trusts do, indeed, impinge deeply upon both the law of obligations and the law of property, but they do not belong essentially to either. They belong to the doctrine of patrimony, and the doctrine of patrimony belongs to the law of persons. 71 The trust is itself not a person. A special patrimony never is. But a special patrimony operates very like a person, as an autonomous, quasi-personal, fund.
The patrimonial model of the trust here advanced is not an original one. Others have said much the same. According to the Principles of European Trust Law, 12 "in a trust, a person called the 'trustee' owns assets segregated from his private patrimony and must deal with these assets for the benefit of another person called the 'beneficiary' or for the furtherance of the trust." Liechtenstein law provides that "the trust estate is to be treated as a separate patrimony and the creditors of the trustee have no claim on it." 71 Again Tony Honor6 has written that "the trust estate is a separate fund vested in the trustee... The conception of a separate fund is not confined to common law systems. Other systems of law admit or have admitted the idea: for example the peculium of Roman law, the patrimoine d'affectation of French law, the Sondervermogen of German law." 74 F. H. Lawson remarks that "in the common law countries a Sondervermogen can easily be created by means of a trust."
75 Frans Sonneveldt observes concisely that "the trustee has actually two patrimonies." 76 The Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts 77 is of particular interest to the comparatist since it attempts to explain the trust in a more or less system-neutral manner. "The term 'trust' refers to the legal relationship created-inter vivos or on death-by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose. A trust has the following characteristics: (a) The assets constitute a separate fund and are not part of the trustee's own estate, (b) Title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in the name of another person on behalf of the trustee. .. ."
78 This may not be perfect, but it avoids equity and divided ownership, and "separate fund" is special patrimony.
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VI. PATRIMONY AND PERSONALITY
IN Roman law universitas meant a group, considered as a unity. A flock of sheep was a universitas. As with sheep so with persons: groups of people, considered as a group, was a universitas. 80 A patrimony was a universitas. The haereditas iacens, which was what the patrimony was called after the death but before the entry of the heir, was a universitas. A universitas of this sort became known in the ius commune as a universitas rerum (or bonorum or iuris) M to distinguish it from a universitas personarum (or hominum). 82 A universitas personarum was considered as a person-a corporation-in Roman law. 83 Roman law did not quite take that step for the universitas rerum, though it came close to it in some cases, such as the haereditas iacens.
But every such collectivity is potentially a person. "Universitas" itself has both meanings. Eventually the civil law tradition came to recognise two sorts of juristic person: the universitas personarum, the corporation, and the universitas rerum, the foundation. has not gone down this road, recognising only corporations.
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) A foundation is a juristic person which is not a corporation. It has no members. It is an autonomous patrimony dedicated to a purpose-a ZweckvermOgen. Some writers regarded the Zweckvermdgen as having no owner at all. Others described it as owning itself. 86 Others argued that it was "owned" by the "purpose" itself. Others again argued that notionally one could distinguish the juristic person (though memberless) from the estate which was owned: this latter is the dominant conception.
All this casts light on a variety of difficulties. In Quebec law trust assets are ownerless. This, at first sight startling, conception is actually part of the civil law tradition: we have here the patrimony which is wholly autonomous, which has been divorced from any personality, but which has not become a personality in its own right. Lepaulle, who influenced the QuSbecois conception, took the view that: "It is impossible to translate the rights of the trustee into those of an 'owner' in our [i.e. French or, more broadly, civilian] conception of property. He has neither usus nor fructus nor abusus.
nga One understands the logic, but it is not an inescapable one. Scots law, whose system of property law is at least as civilian as that of France, is able to say that the trustee is owner. Indeed, he does have the rights of usus and fructus and abusus: it is merely that he is under an obligation to use those rights for others.
Personality and patrimony are not wholly separate concepts. Universitas could mean either. If one recognises personality one must recognise patrimony: personality implies patrimony. But in addition, as soon as one Trusts without Equity 617 recognises a special patrimony, one is committed to seeing that patrimony either as a person or as a quasi-person. 89 Special patrimonies tend to function as persons, and historically they have shown a tendency to become persons. Lepaulle suggested that it might be better to conceptualise trusts as persons. 90 South African law at one time came close to doing so. 91 The Qu6bec trust goes as far as it is possible to go without actually passing over into personality. Indeed, one might even ask whether, after all, that boundary has not in fact been crossed. In ordinary language the noun "trust" is a person-word. Idiom treats it like "company". "This land is owned by a trust." "These shares are held by a trust." "Trusts are lucrative clients." "The trust is liable for this debt." Ordinary language is right.
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VII. TRUSTEESHIP AS AN OFFICE
IN his various writings on trust law, Honore" has emphasised the concept of "office," and through his influence this has become a key idea in South African trust law. The trustees may hand over to other trustees, and thereafter be freed from further responsibility: this is a form of universal succession, for the new trustees succeed to the whole assets and liabilities of the special patrimony, but it is a universal succession which can occur inter vivos. Moreover, the trustee, as the holder of an office, is removable and replaceable by the court: this is a striking contrast to purely contractual arrangements. The contrast with, say, the German TreuhUnder is a striking one. Honor6 argues that "it is the office that makes the difference between entrusting and trust." 93 The fact that a beneficiary who is dissatisfied with his trustee may ask the court to appoint a new trustee is so familiar that we forget how remarkable it is. Imagine a debtor who, if he is dissatisfied with his creditor, may ask the court for a better one. That is the trust. Honord's concept of office is an important one.* 1 Trust is patrimony, plus office.
VIII. DOES IT ALL MATTER ANYWAY?
WHO cares how the trust should be conceptualised? One reason is that if there is to be legal science, Rechtswissenschaft, there must be taxonomy. In principle taxonomies can be changed: it may be said that if the trust does not fit into a traditional ius commune taxonomy, then so much worse for the taxonomy. But altering a taxonomic system is as inconvenient as changing the classification system in an ancient library. If we are serious about law, trusts must be located in the system.
Another reason is that the trust is expansive. It is expansive in that some jurisdictions have adopted it while others are thinking of doing so, arid it is also expansive in that even those jurisdictions which do not have it increasingly often have to deal with trusts-even if they have not acceded to the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts. How the trust should be conceptualised is thus a current issue. In 1992 a serious attempt was made to introduce the trust into French law. 9 * There are pressures to introduce it to Belgian law, to Dutch law and to other systems. One detailed proposal by a distinguished Belgian lawyer would provide that ownership is vested in the beneficiaries while the trustee has a "real right of administration", an interesting conception which would be a sort of cross between the trust and the bewind. 96 The issues discussed in this article are of practical importance. It is important that lawyers in the civil law tradition understand that the trust is not a "unique institution" and has no necessary connection with equity. Finally, clear analysis shows why the trust, though immensely useful, is also dangerous. Legal systems have tended to agree that juristic personality, because of its dramatic consequences, should be subject to certain conditions, including (with some minor exceptions) the requirement of publicity. Yet the trust, which can be created by a private and even secret act, comes close to being a juristic person. Seen in that light, one can understand why many legal systems have traditionally been so reluctant to recognise special patrimonies. Legal systems contemplating the reception of the trust should be conscious of the implications of such a reception.
IX. SCOTS LAW
SCOTS law is a mixed system. Some areas are derived from English law, others are civilian, while others are home-grown. Scots property law is particularly civilian, and yet Scotland not only has the trust but has had it for a long time-at least since the 17th century-and has it by common law rather than by enactment, 97 (unlike those other civilian or mixed systems which have the trust, such as South Africa, 98 Quebec, 99 Sri Lanka, 100 Louisiana, 101 Mexico, 102 Panama, Puerto Rico, Liechtenstein and so on). It is a native species, rather than an introduced one. It is integrated into the legal ecology. Especially and crucially, it is integrated into a property law system which is civilian. 103 Everyone thinks his own system to be of galactic importance, but Scots law does have a special significance in the area of trusts. As such, it deserves the attention of comparatists, an attention which it has not sufficiently received. Lawson was an exception. Scots law locates ownership in the trustee, 104 and classifies the rights of beneficiaries as simple personal rights, but yet has International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 49 an apparatus of trust law which is, if not quite as extensive and sophisticated 105 as that of English law, yet able to do pretty well everything that business people can fairly ask for. In saying this, I wish to make no special claim for the sagacity of Scots law. Scots law did not consciously take the concept of patrimonium and then develop it eleganter. A legal system which decides to have a trust concept which is to be functionally comparable to the English trust (and the English trust was, especially in the second half of the 19th century, a major influence on the Scottish trust), but which at the same time wishes to preserve its property law system and thus is not prepared to accept equity, really has only one direction to move in. Even today it would be untrue to say that Scots lawyers have fully clarified their thinking about the nature of the trust. 105 Nevertheless, Scots law has something here of interest to the world. 
